Possession of Child Porn Is a Crime of Moral Turpitude

U.S. v. Santa Cruz (9th Cir. 2009)

This should go without saying, but possession of child pornography is a crime of moral turpitude that will have dire immigration consequences.  A recent addition to the list of crimes involving moral turpitude is possession of child pornography, so decided the 9th Circuit.  Santa Cruz, who became a naturalized citizen found to his dismay the seriousness of his past child pornography conviction.  He had applied for and actually became a naturalized citizen, even though he had been previously convicted of the crime.  In the application, there was a question which asked him to describe his past criminal record.  He responded by stating that he broke the law on a certain occasion, but did not describe in detail the nature of the offense.  Despite this admission, he passed through the system and was granted citizenship.  A few years later, the government discovered its mistake.  It learned the crime Santa Cruz mentioned but did not elaborate in his application was possession of child pornography.  Santa Cruz’s conviction stemmed from a search of his computer by custom officials at a border stop a year prior to his applying for naturalization.  In a rare move, after having discovered its mistake, the government sued Santa Cruz in federal court to revoke his naturalization.

The primary issue to be resolved in the case was whether or not possession of child pornography is a crime of moral turpitude.  If the court had decided in Santa Cruz’s favor, he would have retained his citizenship.  Not surprisingly, however, the court ruled against him and, therefore, his citizenship was revoked.  The government demanded that he turn in his naturalization certificate and U.S. passport.  Although not discussed in the case, the government probably began removal proceedings against him afterwards because a conviction of a crime of moral turpitude is a removable offense.

Asylum Application May Be Filed One Year and One Day After Date of Entry into the U.S.

Minasyan v. Mukasey (9th Cir.)

In seeking relief under asylum, there is one extremely important deadline that any person contemplating filing for asylum must be aware of—there is a one year deadline following entry into the United States to file the application. An asylum application, no matter how meritorious and egregious the underlying facts may be, will be denied if this deadline is not met. The asylum laws state the application has to have been “filed within one year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.” The statute is strictly construed, and there are rare circumstances in which an exception will be allowed.
 
In the past, the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has calculated that the yearly period begins on the date of the immigrant’s arrival in the U.S. That is, day one of the calculation begins on the arrival date. This rule has recently been overturned.

The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals determined based upon the plain language of the statute, an immigrant essentially has an extra day to file for asylum. The immigrant in this case first entered the country on a visitor visa on April 9, 2001. He was authorized to remain in the U.S. until October 8, 2001. He overstayed his visa and on April 9, 2002, he filed an application for asylum, seeking to remain in the U.S. because he feared persecution in his home country. His case was denied because the USCIS stated that he failed to apply for asylum within the one-year deadline. By its calculation, the last day for the alien to apply for asylum was April 8, 2002. This was the one year anniversary of his arrival to the U.S.

Because he missed the deadline by a day, the immigrant did not qualify for asylum. On appeal, the man argued he had one year after the date of his arrival to the U.S. That is, the date of his arrival did not count as part of the calculation. Therefore, his application which was filed on April 9, 2002 was timely. The appellate court agreed. The statute states that he had one year after the date of his arrival. That was taken to mean the one year calculation did not begin until the day after his arrival date. For this reason, he had one year and one day to file his asylum application. Therefore, his application was timely in accordance with the asylum statute.

In the grand scheme of things, the new rule does not effect many asylum cases because few are filed so close to the deadline. However, this ruling is important because it settles a long standing dispute as to the last day an asylum applicant may file his case.

Alien Smuggling Is Absolute Bar in Cancellation of Removal Proceedings

Sanchez v. Holder (9th Cir. 2009)

Sanchez, the petitioner in this case was born in Mexico.  He first came to the United States as an undocumented alien in 1988.  He found a job and settled in Oakland, California, residing in the same area and working for the same employer for many years.  In 1993, he briefly returned to Mexico to marry is childhood sweetheart.  In order to come back to the U.S., Sanchez paid a coyote $1000 to smuggle him and his wife into the country.  The couple made it back to California and Sanchez resumed his employment with his old job.  Several years later, they had three children together, all of whom were born in the U.S., and therefore, American citizens.  During the entire time he lived in the U.S., Sanchez paid all his taxes, owned a home, stayed out of trouble with the law, and by all accounts was a respectable member of his community.  His children were model students and did very well in school.

In 2000, the government began removal proceedings against Sanchez because he was an alien not authorized to reside in the U.S.  As a defense, he applied for cancellation of removal.  Sanchez established all of the prima facie requirements.  His children, who are U.S. citizens, would suffer extreme and unusual hardship if he was removed from the U.S.  Also, he resided in the U.S. for at least 10 years.  The immigration judge found that Sanchez met all the requirements for cancellation of removal except that he could not establish that he was a person of good moral character.  Usually, a petitioner will not be able to establish good moral character if he had been convicted of certain crimes.

What was Sanchez’s crime which precluded him from being considered to have good character?  Alien smuggling.  His hiring a coyote in 1993 to smuggle him and his new wife into the country was considered alien smuggling.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) defines alien smugglers broadly as aliens who have at any time “knowingly…encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law.”  By this definition, Sanchez was an alien smuggler because he assisted his wife to enter the country illegally by paying a coyote.

Unfortunately for Sanchez, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E) specifically precludes a person who is an alien smuggler from being considered to have good moral character.  That is, a person who has knowingly encouraged or assisted other aliens to enter the United States illegally may not be found to have good moral character.  Sanchez argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11) provides an exception to this strict rule in that alien smugglers who smuggle in their own family members may still be considered to have good moral character.  However, the court found that this exception did not affect Sanchez because the exception only applied in cases involving applications for waivers of inadmissibility, not cancellation of removal.  Because Sanchez was applying for cancellation of removal, the court found that the “family member” exception to the alien smuggling prohibition against a finding of good moral character did not apply to him.  For this reason, he was precluded from being found to have good moral character and therefore, not eligible for cancellation of removal.

What the court held is that the Attorney General has discretion to grant relief from inadmissibility, but not cancellation of removal.  A curious holding, to say the least.  I’m not entirely persuaded by the court’s reasoning, but nonetheless, it is now the law in the 9th Circuit.  The bottom line is that it will lead to more denials of cancellation of removal petitions because it gives the government counsel an almost non-defensible opportunity to trip up the petitioner during cross-examination because many such persons at one point or another paid someone else to help them enter the country.

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